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Medical science and changes in personal behavior have extended life expectancy and will
continue to do so in the years ahead.  A variety of social changes have led to reduced birth rates. 
The result has been an increasing relative number of older persons in the population and a slower
rate of growth of the population and of the labor force. These trends will continue in the future,
perhaps at an accelerating rate. 
 Some European countries are beginning to experience an actual decline in the total size
of the population and of the labor force.  Even where that has not occurred, the size of the labor
force has been growing more slowly than the total size of the population, causing a reduction in
the ratio of employees to total population.  In Spain, for example, the official United Nations
projections show the total population will remain essentially unchanged over the next 50 years
while the number of workers per retiree will fall sharply from 4.5 today to fewer than 2 in 2050.
The aging population will cause substantial increases in the cost of the current
government pension and health care programs. In Spain, the cost of the Social Security pensions
is projected officially to nearly  double over the next 50 years, rising from 8.4 percent of GDP-2- Aging and Immigration..2006
now to a projected 15.7 percent of GDP in 2050.  Over this same period, health care is projected
to rise from 6 percent of GDP to a bit more than 8 percent of GDP – presumably because of
assumed tough government expenditure controls that outweigh the natural consequence of an
aging population and rapidly improving medical technology. 
This paper discusses the ways in which governments can respond to these budget
problems with particular attention to the  proposal to use increased immigration to offset the slow
growth or decline of the native labor force. Before doing so, the paper begins by examining some
of  the direct economic consequences of the aging population and the resulting slowdown of
population growth.  
Direct Effects of Slower Population Growth on Per Capita Incomes
Of course, slower growth of population implies a smaller labor force and therefore a
smaller level of total gross domestic product.  But the size of the national economy is much less
important than the level of per capita income because it is per capita income that affects the
standard of living.  The adverse effect of the slower population growth on per capita income and
therefore on the standard of living is therefore the focus of this section. 
As I will explain, slower population growth depresses the rate of saving and therefore
reduces the volume of business investment in productivity-enhancing equipment and structures. 
Slower population growth also reduces productivity by its effect on the quality of the labor force. 
The cumulative effect of both of these can be quite significant unless policy measures are taken
to offset them.
Consider first the effect of slower population growth on the national saving rate. At any-3- Aging and Immigration..2006
point in time, there are some households that are savers (i.e., consuming less than their entire
after-tax income) and other households that are dissavers (borrowing or using up some of their
previous saving).   The savers are predominantly middle aged employees who are preparing for
retirement.  The dissavers are typically in their retirement years.  In a growing economy there are
relatively more middle-aged savers than there are older dissavers.  That, together with rising per
capita income, is what causes the saving of the savers to be greater than the dissaving of the
dissavers.  That difference between the saving and the dissaving creates a positive saving rate for
the economy as a whole.   The faster the population growth rate, the higher will the nation’s
saving rate tend to be.  That explains why the aging of the population and the slower rate of
population growth cause a decline in the share of national income that is saved. 
This lower rate of saving will  in turn lead to a lower rate of investment in business plant
and equipment.  Although in principle Spain could in the future supplement its lower saving rate
by  importing capital from other countries, this is not likely to happen in practice for two
different reasons.  First, the other industrial countries are also experiencing slower population
growth and that will cause their saving rates to decline.  So they too would want to import capital
and would not be in a position to shift capital to Spain.  Moreover, experience shows that, over
sustained periods of time,  industrial countries invest what they save at home.  So even countries
with higher saving rates will tend to keep the extra saving at home. 
The lower level of investment in plant and equipment reduces the capital intensity of the
economy and therefore reduces the productivity of employees and the overall level of national
income.  In addition, a lower rate of business investment causes a lower rate of introduction of
new technology which further reduces the growth of productivity.-4- Aging and Immigration..2006
An aging work force also lowers productivity growth directly.  We know from experience
that each generation of employees earns more than the previous generation.  One reason for this
is the improved level of education and of skills that the new generation brings to work.  We are
all aware of the greater facility that younger workers generally have in using computers and the
internet. Younger workers also generally learn new skills more readily.  So an aging workforce
means lower increases in productivity from this source as well.
In short, the aging of the population that results from the combination of increased
longevity and a reduced birth rate will directly reduce the growth rate of the economy by slowing
the growth of the capital stock and by weakening the productivity of the labor force.  These
problems are made worse by the budget impact of the aging population, the subject to which I
now turn.
Economic Consequences of the Budget Effects of the Aging Population
The governments of most industrial countries provide pensions and health care to older
residents.  The costs of the pension programs rise proportionately with the number of older
persons, implying that these costs will rise faster than GDP as the ratio of older individuals to the
number in the working age population increases. Health care costs of the aged rise even faster
than the number of older persons because the health costs are relatively greater for the “old-old”
and that group is growing relatively faster than the total number of aged.
The rising cost of pensions and of health care for the aged directly increase the
government’s budget outlays when these programs are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, as they
are now in the United States and in most other major industrial countries.   Although these costs-5- Aging and Immigration..2006
can be financed temporarily by borrowing or selling government assets, on a sustained basis
these costs can only be financed by higher taxes.  
The increase in tax rates needed to finance the higher costs that result from an aging
population will be very large indeed unless there is some change in benefits or in the financing of
these programs for the aged so that they do not have to rely exclusively on pay-as-you-go tax
finance.  Before looking at such alternatives, consider the magnitude of the tax increase that
would be required. 
In the United States, a county in which the future demographic change will be smaller
than the change in Europe and Japan,   the payroll tax that is used to finance Social Security
pension benefits would have to rise from about 12 percent now to about 20 percent by 2030.  As
a fraction of GDP, this would represent a rise from about 5 percent to about 8 percent. In the
typical European country the rise in taxes would be even greater because of the greater generosity
of the existing benefits and the greater increase in the ratio of the number of  retirees to the
number of working persons.  In Spain, social security pensions already take 8.4 percent of GDP
and that is projected to nearly double to 15.7 percent of GDP by 2050.  
These implied large tax increases would have major adverse effects on any economy.
Consider the effect of higher payroll taxes.  In the short run, the portion of these taxes paid by
employers would cause a reduction in hiring and in employment.  Over time, the payroll taxes
would be shifted to employees in the form of lower hourly wages.  Such a reduction in wage rates
would reduce the growth of pretax incomes in many ways.  The most direct way would be
shortening the number of hours per year that employees want to work.  We already see this in the
comparison of European and US working hours with Europeans having longer vacations and-6- Aging and Immigration..2006
fewer average working hours per week. Two earner couples are also less common in Europe than
in the United States.  I believe that high marginal tax rates on labor income are a major reason for
these differences.  
The reduction in working hours reduces output and total labor income.  This in turn
means that tax rates have to be even higher to finance the projected rise in benefits.  
Fewer working hours are only one part of the adverse effect of higher tax rates on the
supply of labor in the economy.  Individuals respond to higher marginal tax rates by choosing
occupations that pay less but that are also more pleasant or less onerous.   High marginal tax rates
also discourage the acquisition of new skills through formal education and on the job training. 
And high marginal tax rates reduce the effort that employees bring to the job.  Why work harder
when the government is going to take a large share of the reward for that extra effort?  And why
take the risks associated with entrepreneurial activities when the extra gains will be subject to
high tax rates?
So in all of these ways the high marginal tax rates that would result from using taxes to
 finance the current benefits as the population ages would cause a reduction in national income
and in economic growth.  
The need to finance the increased pension and health benefits of an aging population
would also result in greater taxes on business profits and on household  income from savings, i.e.
on dividends, interest,  and capital gains.   Such taxes would be a further burden on the economy
and on economic growth.  High taxes on investment income reduce the incentive for firms to
invest in new plant and equipment.  Multinational firms can also shift investment to other
countries.  High taxes on the return to saving – i.e. higher taxes on dividends, interest, and capital-7- Aging and Immigration..2006
gains – cause households to shift consumption to the present from the future.  And the specific
forms of capital taxation often shift capital from more productive uses to investments like
housing that do much less to raise national income and economic growth.  
Avoiding these tax increases requires making fundamental changes in the level of
benefits or the way that benefits are financed.  In the United States, avoiding an increase in the
taxes to finance pension benefits would require cutting projected benefits by about one-third over
the next twenty years or so and keeping benefits at this relatively depressed level.  The required
reductions in health care spending on the aged would have to be even larger.   Such a large
reduction would cause financial hardship for many of the aged and would require fundamental
reductions in the level of medical care.  I think neither of these changes is likely to occur.
That is why many countries are thinking about or actually adopting a new approach to
financing pension benefits for the aged.  That new approach involves introducing an investment
based component alongside the tax-financed benefits.  In that way, benefits can be maintained
while higher tax rates are avoided.
Before talking about how such reforms can work in practice, I want to talk about two
other possibilities that are frequently discussed: increasing immigration and reducing spending
on other forms of government activity, particularly national defense spending.
Increasing Immigration
Much of the discussion of the aging population that one hears in Europe involves a call
for increased immigration as a possible policy response.  It is easy to understand how people are
drawn to this conclusion.  If a low birth rate leads to slow population growth and health-8- Aging and Immigration..2006
improvements lead to an aging population, why not increase the immigration of young and
middle aged workers?  That will reduce the average age of the population and increase the rate of
population growth.  Although there is general discomfort with some of the social consequences
of increased immigration, many people have concluded that increased immigration is the “only
way” to avoid a major increase in tax rates or a major cut in benefits.  
The presumed advantage of increased immigration as a policy response to the aging
population is that it would help to finance the benefits of the aged.  The contribution of the
immigrants to their new host country is that they pay taxes.  It is not the work of the immigrants
or their income that matters for this purpose but their role as taxpayers.
But while this case for increased immigration seems plausible, a little reflection on the
magnitude of the fiscal effect of increased immigration shows that a very large increase in
immigration would have only a very small impact on the revenue needed to deal with the aging
population.
In any market economy,  the additional output that the new immigrants produce goes
either to them in the form of wages or to the government in the form of payroll taxes.  The
immigrants would also pay income taxes and value added taxes.  But not  all of that additional
tax revenue is available to help finance the benefits of the existing (“native”) aging population. 
Some of the tax revenue generated by the immigrants is needed to finance the benefits that they
themselves consume – especially health care and education.  
It is necessary therefore to ask how much net revenue is created by immigration to
finance the benefits of the existing aged and how that additional revenue relates to the size of the
increased number of immigrants.  My calculations indicate that the extra revenue is not large-9- Aging and Immigration..2006
relative to the increased number of immigrants.  I wonder just how many of those who advocate
increased immigration as the response to the aging population have calculated how little
additional net revenue is achieved by a substantial increase in immigration.  Stated differently,
the increased revenue from a large rise in immigration would finance only a small part of the
coming rise in the cost of pension and health benefits.
Here are some simple back of the envelope calculations for Spain. The analysis would be
much the same for other European countries.  An inflow to Spain of an additional 2 million new
immigrants of working age would be equivalent to a 10 percent increase in the size of Spain’s
labor force.  If the increased immigration could be limited just to those who enter employment,
that would be equivalent to a 54 percent increase in the size of the foreign population in Spain.  
Of course, some of these immigrants would bring dependents with them, making the rise in the
immigration population more than the 2 million workers.
A rise of more than 50 percent in the number of immigrants in Spain would have a major
impact on social and political conditions.  What would it mean in terms of additional tax
revenue?
Since immigrants generally earn less than “native” Spanish employees, a rise in the
number of immigrants equal to 10 percent of the labor force would probably cause the total labor
compensation to rise by about 8 percent or less.  And since wages are only about 75 percent of
total GDP, a rise of 8 percent in gross wages would be equivalent to a 6 percent rise in the size of
GDP.  
Although taxes would take some of this additional gross wage income, at least half of the-10- Aging and Immigration..2006
additional 6 percent of GDP would be consumed by the immigrants and their families. An
additional fraction of the 6 percent extra GDP would be used by governments to finance benefits
for the immigrants and their families  – health benefits, education benefits,  unemployment
compensation, and eventually retirement benefits.  So the net additional benefits available to pay
benefits of the native population would be only about 2 percent of GDP or less.
This 2 percent of GDP is very small relative to the cost of providing social benefits to the
future Spanish population.  Government spending on Social Security pensions and health care is
now 14 percent of GDP and is project to rise by 2050 to 24 percent of GDP. The 2 percent of
GDP in net revenue that would result from a 50-plus percent rise in the number of immigrants in
the population would therefore finance less than 10 percent of the projected pension and health
benefits. 
Another way to look at this is to note that reducing the growth of benefits by less than one
tenth of their projected level would provide as much fiscal relief as a 50-plus percent increase in
the number of immigrants. 
If pension benefit rules are modified so that total Social Security pensions rise from
today’s 8.4 percent of GDP to 13.7 percent of GDP in 2050 instead of the currently projected
15.7 percent, the savings would be as great or greater than the net revenue effect of 2 million
additional immigrant workers and their families.
 It is clear from this calculation that an increase in the number of immigrants would not
solve the financing problem facing the Spanish economy in the coming years.  The increased
immigration would moreover provide only a temporary fiscal relief to a permanent demographic
problem.  The aging of the Spanish population and the slower rate of growth of the population-11- Aging and Immigration..2006
will persist in the long term.  The extra immigrants who might arrive in the next decade would 
provide more revenue temporarily but would eventually receive retirement pensions and health
care that absorb the extra taxes that they pay.  It would take a continuing increase in the number
of immigrants to achieve even the relatively small additional revenue that I have described.
Whether or not this use of increased immigration to raise additional short term revenue is
a favorable trade-off – i.e., whether the nation would be better off with a relatively small
reduction of benefit growth or a relatively large increase in the number of immigrants – is a
political decision that Spain and every other country must make for itself.  
There may also be other reasons to favor increased immigration.  The new immigrants
would certainly enjoy an improved standard of living for themselves, their children and their
descendants.  But it would be wrong to advocate increased immigration as a policy that is needed
to deal with the aging of the population or even as one that could successfully avoid large future
tax increases or benefit reductions. 
Redirecting Budget Outlays
An alternative to raising taxes, reducing the benefits of the aged,  or increasing
immigration would be to reduce some other forms of government spending and to redirect those
budget funds to the programs for the aged.  There are many ways in which government outlays
could be reduced without hurting the economy.   Every country could benefit from reducing
subsidies to inefficient industries or low productivity agriculture.  Such changes would be
desirable even if there were not a new problem of reduced tax revenue and increased benefits due
to the aging of the population. -12- Aging and Immigration..2006
But the policy debates in Europe do not indicate much likelihood of significant reductions
of government outlays.  Indeed, much of the talk about the Lisbon agenda has induced European
governments to find new ways to increase government spending in the hope of raising the growth
of productivity.
The major exception to this reluctance to cut government spending is the idea that
reducing defense spending may be an appropriate response to the fiscal problem of the aging
population.  Although much could be done to make defense outlays more efficient, the small size
of current defense budgets implies that reduced defense outlays would do little to deal with the
fiscal problem of the aging economy.  Cutting defense budgets in half would finance only about
one tenth of the increased fiscal cost caused by the aging of the population.  
Reducing defense spending in the coming years would create other problems. NATO is
currently struggling in Afghanistan to find sufficient troops and firepower to deal with the
Taliban. The terrible terrorist incidents  in Madrid and London remind us of the increased threat
of domestic terrorism.  More funds for defense and for intelligence activities are going to be
needed in the years ahead just to maintain the current level of national security. 
Mixed Financing of Pension and Health Benefits
There is, fortunately, another way to avoid the future tax increase without cutting future
retiree incomes.  Shifting from the current pure pay-as-you-go tax financed systems of pensions
and health care to financing based on a combination of taxes and financial investments could
reduce the burden on future generations of employees and taxpayers without lowering the
standard of living of future retirees. -13- Aging and Immigration..2006
I will focus on how such a mixed system could be used to deal with the increasing cost of
pensions.  A similar approach could help to finance the increased health costs of the aged.
Avoiding the currently projected large tax increase to finance benefits for the aged would 
require  limiting the  future tax-financed benefits.   But in a mixed system those tax financed
benefits would be supplemented by investment based benefits – i.e., benefits that would be
generated by saving and investing those savings in stocks and bonds.
Several countries have already pursued this approach. The specific ways that they have
done so differ from country to country, depending on local political preferences and economic
conditions.  The most common form is to divide the social security payroll taxes into a portion
that is used by the government to pay tax-financed benefits and a separate portion that the
individual can direct to a mutual fund or a bank or an insurance company where those funds are
invested.  When the individual reaches retirement age, he or she receives both a tax-financed
pension and an additional pension based on the value of the assets that the individual has
accumulated in the investment-based account.  Such mixed systems for financing pension
benefits have been adopted by such diverse countries as Sweden, England, Australia, Mexico and
China.
Although a mixed system can avoid the very large tax increase that would be needed with
a pure tax-financed pay as you go system in order to maintain the current relative level of
benefits, it is not costless.  Some additional saving must be done to fund the individual accounts.
But because the rate of return on an investment based account is much greater than the implicit
return in a pure tax-financed system, the amount of saving that is needed is much less than the
amount of additional taxes that would otherwise be required.  The required amount of savings-14- Aging and Immigration..2006
depends on the demographic projections and the investment strategy. Detailed calculations for
the United States based on the assumption that the savings are invested in a mixture of 60 percent
equities and 40 percent bonds  indicate that the tax increase equal to nearly 10 percent of taxable
wages that would be required with a pure pay-as-you-go system could be replaced by new
savings of 2 percent of the same wage base. 
While a mixed system avoids the near certainty of benefit cuts in the future, the
investment based component does of course  involve some risk.  The amount of the risk depends
on the mix of stocks and bonds in which the extra saving is invested.  Countries that adopt this
approach generally require that the investments are made in broad-based mutual funds rather than
in individual stocks or narrow industry-specific funds.  Some countries restrict the proportion of
equities in the investment funds.  It is also possible to provide guarantees that limit the risk that
an individual would receive a pension below some desired amount.  These guarantees could be
provided by the government or by the financial markets.
Conclusion
The ageing of the population presents a major fiscal challenge for the countries of
Europe. Continuing the current tax-financed systems of social pensions and health care will
require substantial increases in the already high tax rates.  The analysis in this paper shows that
the common prescription of increased immigration would do little to reduce the future fiscal
burden.  The only alternative to significantly higher tax rates or substantially lower retirement
income  is to shift from a pure tax-financed system to a mixed system that supplements the tax
financed benefits with benefits based on increased saving and financial investment. -15- Aging and Immigration..2006
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